The full implementation of the Third Package has to be the basis on which the Energy Union is built. Implementation, particularly of the network codes, which are the rules of the game of the internal energy market, has to remain a priority for all parties involved.
Network codes cover, in the broadest way, the experience, knowledge and needs of the system gained in an impressive process of co-operation throughout all of Europe. This achievement needs to be preserved and implemented. To improve the way this is done, the experience of the six years should be efficiently exploited by all parties involved to increase effectiveness and transparency further on and to learn for the next steps.
With regard to infrastructure and Projects of Common Interests (PCIs), ENTSO-E sees a vital need to focus on ‘getting it done’: on getting the infrastructure built, since it is the bottleneck for deploying large amounts of RES and ensuring that customers all across Europe benefit from reliable and competitive power. However, after several consecutive TYNDPs and PCI processes, it must be acknowledged that only one-third of the planned lines is on schedule. This gap is the consequence of overly complex permitting processes. ENTSO-E therefore welcomes the establishment of the Copenhagen Infrastructure Forum. We recommend a specific role for the Forum in developing solutions for getting the trans-European energy infrastructure from promise to practice. Furthermore, it is a prerequisite to address financing issues, providing the right incentives to enable the investments in an efficient manner. These obstacles must be overcome through strong European and national action on the regulatory side.
The EC and Member States should adopt all European network codes with no delay.
The EC and ACER should consider in a non-binding manner how best to coordinate infrastructure permitting regionally so cross-border impacts are taken into account appropriately.
Member States should voluntarily reinforce regional coordination of energy policy with potential trans-national effects. ENTSO-E’s adequacy analyses can be a useful basis for Member States’ discussions on security of supply issues.
Incentive regulation in EU Member States has to include budget for public acceptance actions, as well as for innovation. This is largely not the case today. As a first step, ACER should benchmark best practice of regulatory treatment in these areas.